Gridlock - Regulatory Regimes in the Thai Passenger Transport Sector by Pich Nitsmer
GRIDLOCK: REGULATORY REGIMES IN 
THE THAI PASSENGER TRANSPORT 
SECTOR
PICH NITSMER
FISCAL POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 
THAILAND
PNITSMER@VAYU.MOF.GO.TH 
EABER WORKING PAPER SERIES
PAPER NO. 21
EABER SECRETARIAT
CRAWFORD SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND GOVERNMENT
ANU COLLEGE OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

























Fiscal Policy Research Institute 
6 October 2006   1
Abstract 
   
The Thai passenger transport sector remains dominated by ailing state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs).  Virtually untouched by post-1997 crisis liberalization and privatization 
schemes that would have revitalized these “zombies1”, the managerial and regulatory 
architecture of transport SOEs continue to be complicated.  Departments under at least two 
ministries and three sectoral commissions with complex structures regulate the sector with 
unclear lines of responsibilities.   Lacking regulatory expertise, public officials often make 
decisions on an  ad hoc basis and abusively protect the  status quo just as the financial 
performances of these SOEs, especially “welfare” bus and railway operations, deteriorate.  As 
this paper will demonstrate, privatization, shock therapist’s knee-jerk response to this structural 
problem, may be inappropriate unless regulatory institutions are strong and independent, 
restraining conflict of interest and rent-seeking behavior of public officials.  Because “regulatory 
capture” is prevalent, Thailand should first consider institutional remedies, most importantly 
separating regulatory function from operation and policy-making, whilst increasing public 
awareness and strengthening competition regime. 
 
                                       
1 “Zombie” is a nickname for too-big-to-fail enterprises that operate at a great loss yet receive financial support 
from the government.   2
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Setting the Stage 
 
  By the early 1990’s, Thailand had achieved an unprecedented level of economic success 
never experienced in any countries except China.  Along with relative abundance of labor and 
natural resources, Thailand’s liberal economic policies, encouraging private competition and 
trade and investment openness while preserving fiscal conservatism, have miraculously pushed 
growth rates up to double-digit levels.  Parallel to such economic advancement is the transition 
to democracy.  After the 1992 “Black May” crisis2 that led to a clash between the military and 
anti-government protestors, democracy flourished and civilians were elected as prime ministers, 
boosting investor’s confidence in the Thai economy.  The kingdom looked set to become 
another Asian “tiger”. 
  Yet, there were increasing signs of weaknesses in the policy management of various 
sectors, especially among SOEs.  The government deliberately protected them from private 
competition, insolvency and takeover only at the burden of taxpayers.  When the 1997-1998 
financial crisis unexpectedly struck, they became net drawers on government budget, rather 
than net providers.  There was then the popular perception that the crisis highlighted the need 
for public enterprise reform in Thailand. 
  Introducing reforms for the SOEs has been an integral part of the Washington 
Consensus-mandated liberalization process initiated since the crisis.   Precisely, in the December 
1997 letter of intent to the IMF, the government proposed a fast-track program of privatization, 
which became the core principle of the 1998 Master Plan for State Enterprise Reform 
thereafter.  Along with energy and telecommunication, transport stood out as areas most likely 
subject to across-the-board privatization, but so far very little progress has been made.   
Resistance to privatization from unionized labor within these enterprises as well as political 
interests involved in the control and management of SOEs have successfully protected public 
transport from privatization.   
  Even if the Thai transport sector remains unprepared for such change in ownership, 
regulatory reforms are much needed.3  It is increasingly obvious that the existing regulatory 
structure has not met, and is unlikely to meet, efficiency or equity aims of regulation, hence 
                                       
2 The “Black May” or “Bloody May” is the popular name for the 17-20 May 1992 massive public protest in Bangkok 
against a military regime and the bloody military crackdown that followed. 
3 In an ideal situation, market should be allowed to function freely without state intervention so that economic 
efficiency is maximized.  However, in the passenger transport market, the government needs to be concerned with 
both “market failure” such as transport operator’s abuse of monopolistic power and “government failure,” 
specifically inadequate public good or service provision.  This is particularly true for Thailand where there is strong 
evidence that the market cannot be left alone without the right government intervention to deal with the sector’s 
inefficiency.  Rather than adopting laissez-faire policies, creating proper tariff and market access regimes seems more 
appropriate at least in the short run.  
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leading to an annual nine-digit loss in dollars for some operators.  One explanation for such 
failure is that the government regards them as “welfare” services and prioritizes in keeping fares 
at an un-operationally low level.  For this reason, most SOEs have no incentive to contain costs, 
chronically run at a loss and therefore require subsidization.  This implies that, given the 
interventionist role of the State, the important question is not the extent but the quality of such 
intervention. 
  Exploring regulatory regimes in the Thai passenger transport sector, this paper has five 
sections.  Section 1 provides an overview of the SOE-dominated transport operation and 
highlights signs of organizational inefficiency in the current setting.  Such problems can be 
explained by the top-down approach of policy development in Thailand, which will be briefly 
discussed in Section II.  This is to examine broad issues in Thai policy-making procedures before 
investigating the existing regulatory framework in Section III.  In a detailed fashion, the analysis in 
this section will explain how the overlapping authority in regulatory decision-making is 
inconsistent with the characteristics of “good” regulation provided in Dee (2006).  Then, 
Section IV will tackle the most important dilemma transport regulator faces: balancing economic 
and social ends.  The Thai authority is by no means successful in achieving this goal so it is 
appropriate that policy recommendations be made to increase the independence and 
productivity of regulators.  This institutional reform is in fact the core of Section V’s analysis, 
which will lead to an open-ended conclusion of this paper: what is or should be the future 
direction of Thai passenger transport regulation? 
 
 
I. Operation: Zombie Rules 
 
  In the 1980s, the political wind blew in favor of the right and supply-side economics was 
adopted while regulatory reforms prioritized on both sides of the Atlantic.  As the alarm bell 
rang, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher realized the popular dissatisfaction with public 
transport system and thus the need to commercialize services to enhance quality and efficiency.  
Mandated by the Washington Consensus, such reforms did not reach much of the developing 
world, including Thailand, where the state still regards transport sector as a public good and an 
element of national security.  Nationalization is thus justified on two grounds.  Firstly, transport 
network is a classic case of natural monopoly, characterized by fixed cost so high that only one 
firm can fully exploit the potential economies of scale available.  Secondly, because transport 
services are considered public goods, private provisions may be insufficient and this can generate 
negative externalities, from social inequality to congestion and air pollution.  It is therefore a  
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social obligation for the government to operate the transport network “for its people,” 
endowing SOEs with exclusive rights to provide basic services by law.  The reality, however, is 
much more complicated because “social services” are poorly defined as all loss-making transport 
services without a thorough examination of market structure. 
Thai labor unions, by shouting “khaai chart” (the sale of the nation), have been very 
successful in protecting transport services from across-the-board privatization since 1998.  So 
far only two transport SOEs that existed in 1998 have been privatized: Thai Airways 
International and Airport of Thailand (AOT) which runs Bangkok, Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, 
Phuket and Had Yai airports.4  Of all modes of passenger transport, the air travel sub-sector 
stands out as the most liberalized to date, probably because of an inevitably high degree of 




Figure 1: Map of Thailand 
Fiscal Policy Research Institute (2006) 
Quium (2003) ranks transport among areas worst affected by the 1997-1998 recession; 
in this particular sector, private activity in 1999 dropped by one-third from the pre-crisis level.  
Since then, private sector participation in infrastructure projects has risen dramatically though 
involvement is mostly through a concession or licensing arrangement of SOEs, the sector’s 
                                       
4 The sector remains unregulated in terms of air traffic control, dominated by Aeronautical Radio of Thailand 
(Aerothai), an independent arms-length SOE licensed to operate by the AD.  
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dominant force.5  Even in relatively contestable markets, such as long-distance road transport, 
SOEs retain full control of passenger transport operation.  Unlike trucks, buses in Thailand are 
exclusively run under the operation or licensing of Transport Company Limited (TCL), a state 
monopoly that generated $2.2 million profit during the first half of 2006.6  Citing Deunden 
(2005), “since private [firms] are not allowed to operate the reserved routes, giving the [SOE] 
exclusivity, they have no choice but to submit to the terms and conditions stipulated in the 
contracts.” 
  Along with the Expressway and Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand (ETA), the TCL is 
indeed a rare breed of “commercial” profit-generating transport SOEs.  Other passenger 
transport SOEs similarly hold monopolistic position and face no competition, yet loss is chronic.  
Structurally similar to the TCL, Bangkok Mass Transit Authority (BMTA) operates or provides 
license to all Bangkok bus routes although political pressure has kept fares at an un-operationally 
low level, making it one of Thailand’s most unprofitable SOEs.  Likewise, in rail passenger 
transport, often dubbed “the most natural of all natural monopolies” because of significant levels 
of economies of scale and network economies, the SRT maintains a tight grip on passenger 
service, consequently suffering from an annual nine-digit loss in dollars.  Just as they are 
taxpayer’s biggest burdens, BMTA and SRT rank among the top ten SOEs in terms of 
employment, hiring more than 37,000 workers: another sign of organizational inefficiency. 
  In areas untouched by the privatization process, private participation is still permitted 
either in the form of full or partial concession or joint venture.  One success story in ridership 
and consumer confidence is the Bangkok Mass Transit System (BTS) or “skytrain” concession: a 
100 percent privately funded project.  The infrastructure of Bangkok subway, on the other hand, 
is state-financed and partial recovery-based, with rolling stocks, telecommunication tools, power 
supply and depot equipment in the hands of private investors who share fare revenue with the 
Mass Rapid Transit Authority (MRTA), an SOE, under a 30-year build-operate-transfer 
concession contract.  An alternative form of public-private partnership is joint venture, such as 
the Thai Maritime Navigation Company Limited (TMN), an SOE and a leader in cargo shipping 
that competes with private logistics firms. 
  As stated above, the most liberalized area of transport is aviation, followed by the 
maritime transport sector where in general cargo ships, boats and ferries are privately run.  
Thailand boasts about ten private airlines, most notably the high-frills Bangkok Airways.   In 
tourist destinations where Aviation Department-run provincial airports are lacking, Bangkok 
                                       
5 The size of Thai SOEs is not to be underestimated.  In 2004, their total revenues and assets are 28 and 82 percent 
of GDP respectively. 
6 All figures in this paper are quoted in US dollars.  
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Airways builds its own, providing it with monopolistic access to three airports: Koh Samui, Koh 
Chang and Sukhothai.  In fact, Thai airlines are a sort of national pride.  In 2002, prior to 
privatization, Thai Airways received more passengers than any other Asian carrier although its 
revenue ranked third, behind Singapore Airlines and Cathay Pacific.  After privatization, it has 
retained its international market share but contracted non-core, domestic routes to its sister 
Nok Air.  Particularly after the emergence of budget airlines, price competition in the airline 
industry has been welcome: a situation not found in other passenger transport markets.  
Nevertheless, as in most countries, foreign carriers, though not foreign investment, are 
prohibited from domestic routes. 
Judging from Table 1, the most contestable markets, especially if not qualified as “welfare 
service,” are most open to competition.  These include air and maritime passenger transport as 
well as freight logistics.  On the other hand, certain transport modes, namely buses and trains, 
have distributive importance, hence a strong, albeit irrational, political will that too-big-to-fail 
zombie SOEs will continue to walk.  Although private firms are allowed to operate under the 
watchful eyes of the SOE, this operational structure has negative social implication.  Quoting 
Nipon (2002), “exclusive licensing, concession and privileges in these businesses do not only 
contribute to an uneven playing field, but also result in high economic rents and generate 
extensive rent-seeking and corrupt behavior.”  These problems of course are irrelevant to 
freight transport where private competition normally governs the market and distributive issues 
need not be considered.   The following sections of this paper will therefore focus on passenger 
transport which poses three major problems to the economy: huge financial burden, the lack of 
competition, and unsustainable balance of economic and social aspirations.   
 
Table 1: Operation of Transport Infrastructure and Services in Thailand 
Mode  Type  Infrastructure  Service 
Passenger 
(Bus) 
•  Departmental (DLT)  •  SOE (TCL & BMTA) with 
licensing 
Road 
Freight  •  Private   •  Private (Logistics, firms) 
Passenger  •  SOE (SRT) 
•  SOE (MRTA) with concession 
•  SOE (SRT) 
•  SOE (MRTA) with concession 
Rail 
Freight  •  SOE (SRT)  •  SOE (SRT) 
Passenger  •  Private (Ferries)  Maritim
e  Freight 
•  Private (Ferry piers)  
•  SOE (PAT) 
•  Departmental (Local piers under 
local authorities) 
•  Private (Ships)  
•  SOE (TMN) 
Air  Passenger  •  Private (Bangkok Airways 
airport)  
•  Private (Airlines) 
•  Privatized (Thai Airways)  
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  Freight  •  Privatized (AOT)  
•  Departmental (Provincial 
airports under AD) 
•  Private (Cargo planes) 
Fiscal Policy Research Institute (2006)  
II. Policy Development Process: a Top-down Approach 
 
  The development of SOEs has always been a major component of Thailand’s public 
policies manifested in national and sectoral plans.  In the national context, there are four 
agencies directly concerned with national economic policy planning, the first two being under 
the jurisdiction of the Office of the Prime Minister: the National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB), the Bureau of Budget, the Ministry of Finance, and lastly the Bank 
of Thailand.  In general, these agencies are armed by a corps of highly competent, Western-
trained economists known as “the technocrats.”  Taking an economy-wide approach, the 
NESDB produces the five-year National Plan which provides a reference for budgetary 
purposes.  Subsequently, each ministry develops its own plans and projects in accordance with 
the National Plan to be approved by the Bureau of Budget if judged to be consistent with the 
Plan.  Generally speaking, national and sectoral plans do not set priorities according to cost-
benefit estimates, nor do they take into account budget constraints.  After the plans have been 
translated into investment programs or projects, the Bureau of Budget will consider them in the 
context of resource constraints.   
However, sectoral (or specifically the line minister’s) policies are arguably the playing 
field of less competent but politically well-connected ministers who wish to distribute rents 
among their factions and constituents.  In fact, ministerial candidates are sometimes pre-selected 
as a reward for loyal party service rather than because they are the right people for the job.  
For this reason, ministries tend to include as many ideas as possible in their own platforms even 
though they are expected to follow the NESDB’s somewhat vague strategies.   
This is thanks to one important aspect of Thai policy-making: the legislation supporting 
each line minister is usually brief and vague, bestowing substantial discretionary power to the 
ministers through ministerial regulation and policy implementation.  Therefore, there is an 
incentive for parliamentarians to hold an executive post in these ministries rather than to 
regulate through legislative process.  
In relation to SOEs, the NESDB has supported the establishment of such enterprises but 
not in perpetuity.  SOEs, like other products or entities, have a life cycle and eventually their 
responsibilities shall be overtaken by the “invisible hands” of firms.  This statement is defended 
and clarified in Article 50 of the 1997 “People’s Constitution”: “Every person has freedom … to 
fairly engage in free competition.  … The aforementioned freedom shall not be limited except  
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… for the benefit of … consumer protection, … environmental preservation, public safety or 
anti-monopoly or the eradication of unfairness in competition.”  Article 87 likewise guarantees: 
“The state shall promote free market economy, ensure fair competition, protect consumers and 
prevent direct and indirect monopoly.”  In short, the promulgated constitution does not 
support government intervention or state monopoly. 
  This view contrasts with the contents of the 1999 Trade Competition Act (TCA) that 
replaced the totally ineffective 1979 Price Fixing and Anti-Monopoly Act,7 Thailand’s first 
competition law.  Administered by the Trade Competition Commission (TCC) which associates 
with the Department of Internal Trade, Ministry of Commerce, the TCA only deals with anti-
competitive practices such as mergers and collusive or “unfair trade” activities that threaten 
business competitors, leaving SOEs exempted along with government agencies and agricultural 
cooperatives.  Ironically, Thai competition law cannot be applied to enterprises that, in the eyes 
of Visoot (2001), carry out the most visible anti-competitive acts.   
Legal non-comprehensiveness also leads to enforcement problems.  For example, 
Section 25 of the TCA prohibits business operators with “market domination” from 
unreasonable price fixing or service restriction, without clarifying how market domination is 
measured, leaving much discretion to the administrator.8   Moreover, as the TCC has 
inadequate financial and human resources to operate independently, the toothless commission 
lacks the experience or expertise in enforcement.  To no-one’s surprise, the TCC has 
deliberated only four cases since its inauguration, none related to transport, and nobody has 
been prosecuted.  It should then be emphasized that, in the passenger transport arena, 
competition law is virtually useless despite the prevalence of monopolists. 
 
III. Regulatory Institution: Conflict of Interest 
 
With SOEs exempted from competition law, transport operation is controlled by 
informal top-down sectoral regulations which, quite like a spider web, prove as confusing as 
could be.  First it must be understood that two types of “regulators” exist: 1) departmental 
regulators under direct control and acting as agents of their respective ministries and 2) semi-
independent, sectoral commissions consisting of the Transport Minister and other high-ranking 
officials.   
 
                                       
7 During the 20 years that the law was in effect, only one business, ice trading, was declared a controlled business. 
8 The TCC has attempted to legally establish a market-share threshold as a proxy for market domination, a 
necessary condition for enforcing Section 25, but the approval was blocked by parliament amid a big-business 
lobbying allegation.  
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Figure 2: Policy, Regulation and Operation in the Thai Passenger Transport Sector 
 
Fiscal Policy Research Institute (2006) 
 
If the regulatory matter is internal in nature, such as the scheduling of buses or trains, 
departments only need to interact with SOEs.  However, when the subject of regulation relates 
to price, coverage or other social requirement, commissioners have to approve the 
departmental regulator’s suggestion for the issuance or modification of regulation.  In other 
words, when the regulatory decision has an impact on the non-transport realm, such as a 
Bangkok bus fare hike that pushes inflation up and affects the livelihood of urbanites, the 
sectoral commission, having representatives from both transport and other ministries, must 
support the decision.  In the case where a new piece of legislation is required, it is this 
commission, not departments under any ministries, that forwards the case for parliamentary 
approval through the Secretariat of the Cabinet. 
 




Departments under at least two ministries, Transport and Defense, hold overlapping 
responsibilities in planning and regulation.9  Even though the government assigns the Ministry of 
Transport (MoT) to develop a transport master plan, with layers of bureaucracy, 
implementation is never easy and vulnerable to political influence.  This is because, despite MoT 
supervision of many transport operators through Aviation Department (AD), Marine 
Department (MD) and Department of Land Transport (DLT), the Harbor Department under 
the jurisdiction of Defense Ministry co-regulates the Port Authority of Thailand (PAT) with the 
MD.  ETA, an SOE operating toll roads, had been supervised by the Interior Ministry until 2002 
when the task was transferred to the MoT’s Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning 
(OTP) which enjoys a non-departmental status.  To add more confusion to the regulatory 
architecture, the Office of the Prime Minister acts as the policy director of the MRTA.    
Departmental regulation is in fact a component of a top-down process of Thailand’s 
transport policy-making.  To put it simply, departmental regulators are no more than channels 
through which policies generated at the national or ministerial levels can be implemented into 
SOE operation.  Because transportation cost account for 7.8 percent of Thailand’s Gross 
Domestic Product compared with 2.5 percent in Japan and 2.8 percent in the United States10 
(hence demonstrating the sector’s inefficiency), the NESDB has put transport and logistics 
planning as a national agenda.  With Ministers’ discretionary powers, however, sectoral policy 
implementation is not always consistent with the NESDB’s national blueprint.  The MoT, for 
example, assigns the OTP, its integrated logistics planning and monitoring agent, to play an 
NESDB-like role in producing a five-year transport master plan that will serve as a policy 
guideline for all departments under the MoT.   
Under the umbrella of respective ministries and the guidance of the OTP are 
departmental regulators, responsible for mostly technical affairs, from safety and security to 
congestion control.  In a few areas where transport regulation relates to non-transport issues, 
MoT departments may face difficulties in cooperating with other ministries, such as the Harbor 
Department that regulates PAT port safety or the Office of the Prime Minister which has a final 
say in MRTA supervision.  This is because departmental agents are institutionally set up to 
strictly follow the courses of their principals.11  Department-to-department cooperation thus 
implies ministry-to-ministry collaboration.  Yet, because each ministry has its own agendas, 
                                       
9 The phrase “at least” is used here because under certain scenario, other ministries may indirectly play regulatory 
functions over transport SOEs.  For example, if the ETA wishes to build a suburban motorway, an environmental 
impact assessment must be submitted to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment. 
10 These figures are presented by the President of Thai International Freight Forwarders Association, Suwit 
Ratnachinda. 
11 In Dee (2006), this feature of regulation is identified as the “thirty different governments” effect: “when there is a 
lack of consistency and coordination among different government agencies, businesses can feel they are confronted 
by many separate governments.”  
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policy integration is often dependent on the Prime Minister’s decisiveness in choosing what to 
prioritize.   
In other words, what distinctively characterizes the Thai regulatory process is informal 
decision-making by rationally bounded bureaucrats or politicians whose agendas focus primarily 
on static rather than dynamic or long-term implications.  Unlike in developed economies, formal 
regulatory impact assessment, whether ex-ante or ex-post, does not exist.  MoT departments 
may claim that they occasionally perform cost-benefit analysis of regulation but such evaluation 
is always conducted internally, preventing academics, transport specialists or various 
stakeholders from openly participating in the policy-making or evaluation process. 
 
Regulation by Commission 
 
The legal authority to issue, change or scrap regulation, however, is vested with a 
sectoral steering commission that consists of senior officials from the aforementioned two 
ministries as well as other agencies whose activities are affected by the regulation.  At present, 
there are three commissions: the Maritime Promotion Commission (MPC), the Civil Aviation 
Board (CAB) and the Commission for the Management of Land Traffic (CMLT) which regulates 
both rail and road transport.  Like the TCC, these regulators have broad, semi-independent 
power so enforcement can be arbitrary or discriminatory.  Because the regulatory authority 
rests with commissioners who are mostly bureaucrats that already oversee policy and planning 
and thus sympathize with SOEs, political intervention is a fact of life.  MPC structure is among 
the most complex; the commission must include the Transport Minister and representatives 
from the Permanent Secretariat of five ministries: Transport, Commerce, Finance, Industry and 
Foreign Affairs.  Similarly, the Transport Permanent Secretary acts as the CMLT chairman but 
the commission requires membership of the Interior Permanent Secretary, the Secretary of the 
Council of State, the Commissioner General of the Royal Thai Police, the DLT Director 
General, and Bangkok governor or their representatives. 
The major difference between departmental and commission regulators is ministerial 
affiliation.  Although members of both groups are all civil servants, the latter, comprising of 
bureaucrats from various government agencies, are supposed to take a broader view in 
regulatory decision-making.  One justification for this regulatory model is to have outsiders 
debate policy choices of the core principal, specifically the MoT.  In certain sense, commission 
regulators do provide checks and balances to the power of the MoT.  However, because neither 
departments nor commissions are led by regulation specialists, their mindsets are often shaped 
by the “bounded rationality” of their respective ministries.    
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One of the purposes of having transport commissions is to open the regulatory process 
to non-MoT officials and therefore create a regulatory framework that better fits the inter-
ministerial or economy-wide perspective, but it appears that regulators, departmental or 
commission, do not recognize what regulatory best practice is.  Some even argue that because 
all commissioners hold their main public office elsewhere, these non-professional regulators 
care little about transport regulatory regimes.  When problems arise, they hardly take 
responsibility and simply shift blame to the SOEs or the MoT who has a more direct supervisory 
role. 
Though destined to be independent, commissioners typically make decisions based on 
their ministerial interests, creating intra-commission conflicts, while poorly responding to local 
needs.  Under the Land Transport Act, the CMLT must regulate bus routes, urban and 
provincial, but the Bangkok governor worries most about the provision of services in his 
metropolitan area, leading to disagreements with other commissioners.  When the Bangkok 
parliament convened in 2005 to discuss the governor’s BTS skytrain extension proposal, all 
parliamentary members of one major political party immaturely protested by walking out.  
Transport policy and regulation have been crushed in a political football field. 
As mentioned when discussing about the departmental regulator, the final decision-
making power often rests with the executive branch of government.  Although regulators enjoy 
the privilege of introducing whichever regulation they consider appropriate on an ad hoc basis, in 
many cases they cannot resist political influence, especially when it comes to picking winners and 
losers.  For instance, before the 2005 general election, Donmuang Tollway regular fare was 
reduced from 30 to 20 baht “to benefit locals” despite the understanding that it would put the 
operation in the red.  Commissioners often approve or disapprove government’s proposal to 
change tariff rates without a detailed analysis of demand elasticities.   
In short, the Thai regulatory landscape is characterized by conflict of interest, both 
inside and outside regulatory institutions.  Because regulators serve as agents of their ministries 
with their own set of policy objectives, different agents define “good transport regulation” 
differently.  Outside their meeting room, they face yet another powerful group: rent-seeking or 
vote-maximizing politicians who misuse transport policy for their personal, financial or partisan, 




As regulatory functions of both departments and commissions remain weak, SOEs have, 
in certain aspects, the authority to self-regulate, obscuring the line separating regulation from  
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operation.  All transport SOEs claim their self-regulatory role on their websites but clear-cut 
examples are the TCL and BMTA which act not only as a bus operator but also as a regulator of 
their own and subcontracted routes in terms of quality, safety and schedule.  Private companies, 
in return, are required to pay a royalty fee.  By capitalizing on their monopoly rights, such SOEs 
become over-reliant on “easy money” and neglect efficiency or service improvement, thereby 
upsetting the populace.12  As Nipon and Deunden (2003) put it, Thai regulatory design fuels 
“conflict of interest as state authorities hold an equity stake in or enter into revenue-sharing 
scheme with the business they regulate.”  Self-regulation hardly functions as promised, unlike in 
industrialized democracies where rules, whether established by firms or trade associations, are 
strictly enforced. 
 It is therefore inappropriate that loss-making transport operators are given the very 
power to self-regulate because it adds another dimension to the conflict-of-interest problem.  
The above two subsections explain how ministerial or political interference impedes the 
productivity of regulators short of regulatory capability or financial resources to operate 
independently, blurring the borderline between policy and regulatory roles.  To add yet another 
complexity, some SOEs perform both operational and regulatory tasks.  Unlike in the Western 







Applying Ross Garnaut’s taxonomy of policy-making problems, there are three major 
causes of regulatory failure: 1) public officials’ ignorance of regulatory best practice, 2) 
“capture”13 or resistance from vested interests, and 3) the opposition to good regulation among 
those extracting rents from inferior policies.  In the Thai transport arena, the second and third 
issues are inter-related.  Because the regulated industry is state-supported, the government’s 
reluctance to effectively regulate these transport SOEs also implies the misallocation of public 
resources, creating dead-weight loss as well as rent-seeking opportunities for bureaucrats and 
politicians.  To put it differently, there tends to be a collusion between the regulated and the 
rationally bounded regulator to keep the  status quo, resulting in socially undesirable policy 
outcomes.   
                                       
12 BMTA bus fleet and their service quality have remained remarkably unaltered over the past decades; one 
guidebook describes the network as “ancient.” 
13 Regulatory capture is defined as a phenomenon in which a regulatory body becomes dominated by the interests of 
the industry that it oversees.  
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One excellent example of this capture is how transport policies have been influenced by 
vested interests inside SOEs, most notably labor unions.  Because officials fear political backlash 
from SOE reforms such as privatization, such plans have been stalled for many years, 
demonstrating inflexibility or the lack of dynamic consideration on the parts of regulators.  
Despite unsatisfactory performance of operators, the government prefers to utilize the softest 
form of regulatory enforcement, namely persuasion.  Cited in Dee (2006), one benefit of such 
technique is “its subtle ability to encourage compliance without actually having to … ‘get 
tough.’”  Yet, in Thailand, such non-punitive supervisory option fails to alter SOE behavior.  Due 
to weak enforcement, it is rare that transport SOEs are punished by the authority in one way or 
another, encouraging them to continue draining taxpayer’s money without the investment to 
upgrade service quality.   
In countries with strong democratic fundamentals, the public may express concerns that 
well counterbalance bad regulation, but not so in the case of Thailand.  Although the Thai 
regulatory structure is labeled as “complaint-based,” indicating that regulators make no move 
except when operators or consumers voice their worries, the system lacks adequate consumer 
protection program for informants and complainants, hence low level of public awareness that 
leads to slow adjustment or weak enforcement of rules.   
Because regulation tends to support rather than scrutinize the regulated, Ambrose 
Bierce’s sarcastic description of a lighthouse as “a tall building … in which the government 
maintains a lamp and the friend of a politician” echoes the Thai transport realm very well.  What 
transport regime reveals about the Thai policy-making process: the current setting suffers from 
all three of Garnaut’s problems and hardly satisfies the prerequisites of “good regulation” listed 
in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Comparison of “Good Regulation” and Thai Transport Regime 
Good Regulation*  Thai Passenger Transport Regulation** 
“It must … have a clear 
[net] benefit.” 
Not quite, it attempts to balance efficiency and equity ends 
but results have been mixed; many SOEs operate at a great 
loss and require subsidization yet service especially for the 
poor remains substandard. 
“It must be better than any 
[alternatives].” 
No, it is inferior to formal regulation that is mutually excluded 
from policy planning and operation. 
“It must be robust to 
errors.” 
Not quite, it is institutionally set up to be inflexible and 
vulnerable to political pressure so errors are not minimized, 
nor do they lead to subsequent regulatory re-design. 
“It should contain the seeds 
of its own destruction.” 
No, it disallows open ex-post regulatory appraisals so the 
repeal or amendment of rules only comes at the discretion of 
bureaucrats or politicians. 
“It should state (ex ante) 
what it is going to do.” 
No, it fails to communicate regulatory objectives or establish 
verifiable performance criteria because policy-making process  
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what it is going to do.”  verifiable performance criteria because policy-making process 
is generally ad hoc. 
“It should be clear and 
concise.” 
No, it suffers from “the thirty different governments” 
problem. 
“It should be consistent 
with other laws.” 
Yes, it must be approved by sectoral commissions with 
representatives from both transport and non-transport 
agencies, thus ensuring legal consistency. 
“It must be enforceable.”  Not quite, it faces budget constraint and political interference 
so enforcement is weak, arbitrary or often discriminatory. 
“It needs to be administered 
by accountable bodies.” 
No, it is administered internally without due process of 
regulatory review or consultation with relevant parties. 
*Dee (2006)                   ** Fiscal Policy Research Institute (2006) 
 
IV. Balancing Efficiency and Equality: an Impossible Trinity? 
 
  Explaining the existing regulatory architecture, the above section illustrates how poor 
institutional design leads to suboptimal outcomes.  But in what sense are they suboptimal?  As 
described under the first condition in Table 2, transport regulation is justified on both economic 
and social grounds.  According to Asian Development Bank (ADB)’s “best practice,” regulators 
should serve the public interest, such as universal coverage, and maximize net consumer 
benefits.  However, in developing nations facing financial constraints like Thailand, what 
approach does the authority take in balancing the two ultimate goals?   
ADB’s recipe for achievement is to allow private participation in investment, 
construction and management accordingly to the first objective, while the state should specialize 
in planning, structuring and regulation.  But as the Thai case illustrates, this is more easily said 
than done.  The state, using public interest as an excuse, often interferes with the operation it 
oversees.  For example, the SRT wishes to change its image as a travel means for the poor by 
investing in infrastructure and technology that would allow it to offer fast, efficient services that 
satisfy businessmen, yet such reforms await approvals from governmental departments and the 
CMLT, treating the SRT as a welfare rather than commercial operation.  A third-class seat from 
Bangkok to the northern province of Chiang Mai costs only six dollars, less than half of the bus 
fare the TCL offers and about one-fifth of Air Asia’s economy class ticket booked well in 
advance, but the train journey takes as long as fourteen hours, compared to seven by car and 
only one by plane.  For this reason, the SRT is trapped in a vicious cycle: inferior service quality 
leading to rock-bottom fare and hence no revenue for future investment or technological 
upgrade. 
Other transport for the poor, rural or urban, also shares such fate.  In Bangkok, the 
existing model of operation implies two types of services: “commercial” air-conditioned buses  
 
18
with a distance-based fare and “welfare” regular buses with a uniform flat fare set at an 
unreasonably low level irrespective of distance.  Commercial services are geographically limited 
because DLT favors the concession that focuses on markets with the greatest ability to pay.  By 
contrast, welfare means both a minimization of travel cost and a maximization of area coverage 
so regular buses, often in decrepit condition, can be found across suburbia.  For a 20 kilometer 
ride from Mo Chit to On Nut, the Bangkok regular bus fare, fixed at 0.2 dollar, is only one-fifth 
of the much faster, cleaner and environmentally friendlier BTS skytrain’s.  In the big picture, the 
SRT, TCL and BMTA are welfare businesses but ETA expressways and MRTA mass transit 
projects are means to improve urban efficiency, not necessarily benefiting the poor especially in 
the periphery.   






With parallel operation of commercial and welfare services, Thailand embraces a 
traditional technique of balancing financial and social ends, cross-subsidization, of which there 
are two varieties.  One is intra-SOE, as in the case of BMTA, where revenue from commercial 
operation directly supports the welfare service.  Another is indirect inter-organizational cross-
subsidization between ailing natural monopolists and profit-making businesses.  The BMTA, for 
instance, is fuel-subsidized by the PTT Public Company Limited.  Even in markets where private 
competition exists, such as freight transport, the government provides grants to inefficient SOEs 
“to keep them afloat” while endowing them with privileges including access to government 
loans, land managed by the Bureau of Crown Property that usually carries low rent and, most 
importantly, a captive state market.  All departments are required to use TMN shipping services 
unless TMN-private firm price differential exceeds an established threshold.  Similarly, Thai 
Airways has the exclusive rights to provide services on international routes negotiated under 
bilateral agreements even after privatization. 
Nonetheless, Allport (2000) discusses the un-sustainability of this regulatory 
architecture, chiefly inefficiency and the uneven playing field created by subsidization.  SOEs are 
not incentivized to escape the vicious cycle of substandard service and low tariff because they 
prefer to receive grants and subsidies from the central government.  In return, departmental and 
commission regulators, mostly politicians and bureaucrats, free-ride on the public approval of 
low transport cost yet, when faced with the popular dissatisfaction of service quality or 
punctuality, find it convenient to shift blame to the SOEs by pointing fingers to their operational 
problems.  The most adversely affected group of all, however, is the poor commuters who rely 
on declining transport services.  TCL and BMTA buses are in fact notorious for unpunctuality, 
black smoke and reckless driving.  Under this perspective, bargain service, hardly regulated in 
areas such as safety, not only fails to guarantee equity but also increases social disparity.  As 
transport regulation becomes an obstacle to equilibrating the economic and social goals for 
which they are intended, Thailand has picked a wrong strategy to harmonize the economic and 
social well-being of consumers. 
 
V. Regulatory Reform: Lost in a Spaghetti Bowl? 
   
  Exposing the shortcomings of the current regulatory setting, analyses in Section III and 
IV serve as a stepping stone for future reform recommendation, its benefits being dependent on 
how effectively the government can address Thailand’s institutional weaknesses.  There is no off-
the-shelf “textbook solution” to the problems of the transport sector.  To promote 
competitiveness and efficiency of operators, there are many ways in which Thai transport  
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regulation can be improved, from abolishing strict control on market access to more substantial 
structural changes such as the creation of an independent regulatory agency.  But which types of 
reform should Thailand regard as its priorities?  
 
Competition without Privatization 
 
  Economic liberals, including past administrations in Thailand, consider privatization as the 
ultimate strategy to revitalize the ailing SOEs, but protection-seeking interest groups, both labor 
unions and regulators, disagree.  Privatization, they asserted, led to a domination of profit-
maximizing monopolists with a price-setting power, thereby harming the general public.  These 
protestors are not completely irrational.   Unless transport regulation as well as competition 
and consumer protection regimes are strengthened and stringently enforced, there remains a 
propensity that private operation will either fail or become a dictator in its domain. 
One outstanding example of the former case is railway privatization in Britain.  After 
swift reforms, British Rail’s revenue gradually increased just as customer satisfaction grew, but 
the rise of Tony Blair marked a turning point.  His administration created layers upon layers of 
bureaucracy, such as twice re-shaping the structure of the transport department and re-
arranging the roles of commission regulator.  Since policy and regulatory functions were no 
longer mutually exclusive, financial management of railway operation was obscured while 
earnings and consumer confidence plummeted particularly after the 1999 Ladbroke Grove crash 
that killed dozens.  One year later, the infrastructure operator, Railtrack, financially collapsed 
and privatization immediately became a scapegoat for regulatory failure, including unnecessary 
state intervention.  From the British experience, it should be understood that privatization was 
not an end in itself.  It could not sustain efficiency unless complemented by appropriate 
regulation and enforcement.   
The British case study can be applied to the Thai transport realm.  Regulatory agencies 
never fully function as a result of conflict of interest, impeding regulator’s productivity, and 
political intervention prevails even in spheres where private competition is fierce, such as air 
travel.  In Thailand, privatization usually implies that shares are majority-owned by the 
government: 70 percent in the case of post-privatization AOT.  In other cases, regulators 
allegedly distribute shares through initial public offering unfairly in favor of close associates and 
big businesses.  Therefore, there is no guarantee that the government will refrain from 
interfering in privatized transport operation.  A change in ownership does not always affect the 
regulatory control mechanism which, in the case of Thailand, remains arcane and costly,  
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contrary to the conventional notion of “regulation at the lowest cost”: boosting efficiency, 
cutting prices and stimulating innovation.  
Private operation can be potentially dangerous when the regulated captures the 
regulator or the former uses legal loopholes to adapt to the new regulatory environment 
creatively.  There are various examples from both developed and developing countries where, 
after privatization, transport tariffs skyrocketed, perhaps demonstrating the collusion between 
the regulator and the regulated.  As a result, an ownership change from public to private hands 
may lead to unintended consequences not because of privatization itself but as a result of weak 
regulatory muscle.  A shock therapy may not cure the inefficiency problems within transport 
SOEs so, along with putting appropriate regulatory regimes in place, what Thailand now needs is 
to facilitate competition regardless of privatization.   
This is in fact the European philosophy of utility regulation; SOE is not the cause of 
economic deficiency but their operational structure and incompetent managers are.  Regulators 
should thus sharpen competitive pressures and incentivize SOEs to enhance market forces and 
values within their organization, such as by establishing enforceable quality standard or a target 
for phasing out subsidy.  In chronically unprofitable SOEs, namely the SRT and BMTA, financial 
restructuring assistance, planned as early as 1998, must be pushed forward.   
Therefore, at least in the short run, a viable policy is not to transfer transport operators 
to the private sector but actually to alter operational structure and make them competitive like 
a private firm.  Yet, because regulatory outcomes are dictated and complicated by public officials 
who usually hold overlapping responsibilities in policy and regulation but make decisions in 
accordance with their bounded rationality, this concept of “competition without privatization” is 
perhaps difficult for them to follow.  Politicians and bureaucrats often block reform attempts 
and protect SOEs from competition.  As discussed in Section II, the Thai policy-making process 
in a top-down approach.  Unless the executive power develops a strong leadership to create a 
coherent institutional framework and an integrity in decision-making, regulators will have no 
incentive to do so and continue to regulate the sector on an ad hoc basis without any senses of 
direction.  The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1997) agrees: “The 
most important ingredient for successful regulatory reform is the strength and consistency of 
support at the highest level.”  National transport policy should be clear and cohesive but 
regulatory function separated.   
   




  What the above analysis implies is that, to make SOEs more competitive and 
responsive to social needs at the same time, policy-makers and regulators must be free to act 
on the behalf of the transport sector’s interests, not as a vehicle of politicians or interest 
groups.  To avoid the thirty different governments problem, public officials are expected to 
produce a clear and concise message to operators in a formal rather than ad-hoc manner.  On 
the policy planning side, one simple method of doing so is to provide the MoT with a centralized 
power.  Roles of non-MoT departments, such as the Harbor Department or the Office of the 
Prime Minister, shall be lessened whereas in the regulator’s sphere, commissioners, selected on 
a merit base, must have the full independence to exercise their power free from political or 
ministerial interference, hence limiting the tendency of regulators to play a blame-shifting game.  
In other words, an independent commission that possesses the virtuoso power to regulate shall 
be established as it is no longer appropriate for MoT departments to perform the dual tasks of 
regulation and policy implementation.  Furthermore, in cases where operators self-regulate their 
subcontracted routes, such as the TCL and BMTA, regulatory control shall be transferred to an 
independent regulator.  To better correspond with notions of good regulation, the regulatory 
authority must be separated from policy planning and operational functions in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4: The Ultimate Goal of Institutional Reform in Transport Regulation 
 
Fiscal Policy Research Institute (2006) 
Creating an independent regulatory body is easier said than done.  On webpages, it 
appears that the three existing commissioners have a regulatory power superior to and 
independent from ministerial intervention.  Yet, the conflict-of-interest problem persists 
because of the rules governing the selection of commissioners.  Like other sectoral commissions 
in Thailand, officials from various ministries are assigned to transport commissions without the  
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direct experience in regulation.  Sectoral expertise is thus dispersed which, in economic sense, 
indicates the inefficient division of labor or specialization of skills. 
To set regulators free from political meddling, it should be legislated that they cannot 
hold any other public offices, whether in the bureaucracy and in the legislative, executive or 
judicial branches of government, or have ever been employed in any transport SOEs, thereby 
encouraging only non-politicized experts to take charge of the regulatory agency.  It will be 
most democratic if these regulators are popularly elected but the opportunity cost associated 
with an election may be too high.  As in many Western democracies, these commissioners shall 
be elected and their qualities reviewed by the parliament, with the information regarding each 
candidate available to the public to prevent politicians from capturing the selection process.  
This is to ensure that the chosen candidates represent the crème de la crème of the transport 
field who, unlike regulators in the present model, can fully allocate their time and resources to 
their regulatory tasks. 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of non-state actors, including academics, in the commission 
does not necessarily guarantee institutional independence.   Enabling factors such as a healthy 
budget and regulatory experience must be inserted into the productivity equation.  For this 
reason, capacity-building in terms of skills, intensity and expense of regulatory effort is a 
prerequisite for successful regulatory reform.  Unfortunately, textbooks can offer little help as 
regulators are practitioners, not just planners or academics.  Participation in regional and 
international regulatory forums, for instance, should be encouraged in order to expose 
regulators to the experience of counterparts and their information-sharing network. 
However, regulatory expertise by itself cannot solve many of the existing problems in 
the Thai transport realm, such as the lack of integrity in decision-making or enforcement.  To 
curtail such institutional problems, it is believed that the “sole regulator” model can “de-
spaghettize” the existing regulatory network as well as lower the propensity to regulatory 
capture.  In other words, there should be only one transport regulator, possibly named “the 
Transport Commission,” with only few, say five, expert commissioners who have a final word in 
regulatory decision-making.  If accompanied by accountability devices, such reform can minimize 
the influences of rent-seeking politicians and protection-seeking interest groups, most notably 
labor union, on regulatory outcomes, thereby creating a more competitive environment in the 
transport industry. 
In addition, the sole regulator model will increase the effectiveness of benchmarking and 
ranking programs for comparison purposes among transport SOEs.  For example, once 
considering safety record, the commission may revoke a license of private bus operators but it 
will unjustifiable if the standards applied to rural,  TCL-licensed and urban, BTMA-licensed buses  
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differ.  Using this regulatory strategy, it will be easier to judge if an operation or its service 
provider is underperforming in terms of safety and punctuality, among others.  The poorly rated 
ones must be monitored and perhaps penalised in an enforceable way so the classical technique 
of mere persuasion may not always work.  Regulators need to get tough with substandard 
services while handing rewards or endorsement to the outperforming ones to incentivize 
operators to sustain their superior service standards.    
 
Regulatory Impact Assessment 
 
As crucial as the assessment of operation is commissioner’s reflections on their policies, 
assessing whether their regulatory techniques have an overall positive social impact in the short 
and long terms.  Regulation should be “robust to errors” and “contain the seeds of its own 
destruction,” such statements arguing for a dynamic form of regulation where ex-ante and ex-
post impact assessment plays a central stage.  To follow the conventional notion of regulation at 
the lowest cost, regulation must be critically evaluated and compared to its alternatives before 
any is imposed.  This is to be done in a transparent manner, unlike the present model where 
such appraisal is performed secretively within MoT departments.  Likewise, after regulation has 
been put in place, the commission must re-weight the pros and cons of such regulation.  If the 
latter outweighs the former, regulation must be re-designed to improve its quality and lower its 
cost.  Otherwise, it may have to face its eventual mortality. 
It is already clarified that regulatory review should be conducted both ex-ante and ex-
post, but one may ask how such review should be exercised.  Fundamentally, such assessment is 
often linked to Kaldor-Hicks test of allocative efficiency, which is satisfied if an activity confers 
sufficient benefits on those who gain such that potentially they can compensate all losers while 
still remaining better off, but in the transport sector, equity and social considerations are as 
important as efficiency.  To put it differently, although cost-benefit analysis prevents regulation 
from imposing an unacceptable burden on the economy, hence serving public interests, it can be 
attacked for its irrationality of the “rational actor paradigm”: diffuse public interests are poorly 
represented once all citizens are treated as wealth-maximizing buyer and sellers.14  
If a price ceiling imposed on all SRT trains fails to pass a cost-benefit test, such over-
simplified assessment that takes no consideration of non-efficiency goals may not truly reflect 
the social gains that regulation is about to bring, namely the redistribution of the rich’s income 
                                       
14 Some political scientists argue that cost-benefit analysis favors the rich.  A dollar gain is in fact not of equal weight 
to all individuals accruing it because the way one values the effects of a policy in monetary terms partly depends on 
his wealth so the acceptance of the ex ante wealth distribution biases cost-benefit analysis in favor in those who 
already possess economic power.  Likewise, Self (1975) declares: “the main use of cost-benefit analysis appears to be 
as a supporting argument for particular organizational or policy view-points.”  
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to subsidize poor commuters.  Therefore, it is the responsibility of independent commissioners 
to weigh static against dynamic and economic against social ends.  With such evaluation, ad-hoc 
policy judgment can no longer be justified, forcing regulators to implement what they should 
rather than what they or politicians want.  Following this logic, the establishment of a single 
independent regulatory agency that provides non-politicized experts with a full authority to 
appraise regulation can tackle all of the three problems of Garnaut’s, especially if the assessment 
process is open to the public. 
 
Transparency and Accountability 
 
Regulatory structure, however well designed, cannot completely eliminate the evils of 
capture and corruption unless decision-making process is made transparent and accountable.  
Like in other areas of the Thai government, these are chronic diseases that impede the 
productivity of public officials and create unnecessary social burdens.  Referring to Nipon 
(2002), “many … officials and agencies themselves have become powerful interest groups aiming 
to preserve or increase their share of economic rents, privilege and power.  These problems 
point to the importance of having in place proper policy design, institutional structure and 
administrative capacity.”  The MoT blueprint for logistics development (2005-2008) enlists anti-
corruption as a ministerial agenda although Thais do not doubt this is simply marketing: more 
talk than action. 
  Whether the proposal for creating one independent regulatory body becomes fruitful or 
not, it is therefore necessary that commissioners stringently impose accountability regimes on 
both operators and regulators themselves.  Regarding the former, disclosure is the keyword.  
To lessen information asymmetry between the regulator and the regulated, each service 
provider should be obliged by law to file a report at least annually.  At present, many Thai SOEs 
publish such reports but they are rarely updated and hardly accessible to the general public 
which has the right to know how their taxed income is being spent.  For instance, the most 
recent report available on the TMN’s website is of year 2002.  Like regulators, taxpayers wish 
to assess if subsidization leads to service improvement rather than a mere salary increase of the 
ever expanding SOE labor force but, with limited or outdated information, such judgment is 
virtually impossible.  Enforcing disclosure regime, a relatively non-interventionist form of 
regulation, is vital for creating competitive and performance pressures on transport operators. 
Disclosure is what makes operation transparent and accountable but these merits also 
constitute the basis of “the regulation of regulation.”  Indeed, Baldwin and Cave (1999) lists 
“transparency” and “due process” as two of the five characteristics of good regulation.  When  
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impact assessment is performed, for example, stakeholders must be invited to participate and 
their inputs from various perspectives considered by regulators.  At the same time, 
commissioners must be able to defend their policy choice to outsiders who play a check-and-
balance role and act as “informal” regulators of the real regulators.   
Nevertheless, in Thailand, public awareness on regulatory issues remains low because 
consumers cannot observe clear benefits from such participation yet they are easily misguided 
by anti-globalization protectionists.  In other words, there exists widespread misperception that 
regulatory reform is equivalent to privatization when in fact the two are totally separate matters 
because competition-promoting reforms can be implemented without changes in transport 
operator’s ownership.  Especially after the Thai Administrative Court declared the capital-raising 
scheme for the electricity generation SOE unconstitutional, the public mood, it can be said, has 
turned against reform and the future of SOEs suddenly become uncertain.15 
In the long run, privatization may be deemed necessary once competition law and 
regulatory preconditions are satisfied.  Ministers must not fear labor unions taking to the streets 
and politicizing the agenda, and assure that political leadership will overcome these vested 
interests which benefit from the status quo and resist socially desirable changes.  One diplomatic 
solution to this “mob rule” is to invite opponents to open dialogues and inform them about 
compensation policy, thus lowering the tendency for “status quo bias.”16  At least in Thailand, the 
public mistakenly associates profit-motivated firms with high prices and unregulated service 
quality, although academic research mostly illustrates the opposite.  In the real transport world, 
such as the airline industry, there are innumerable cases of reform creating social benefits in the 
long run despite initial job losses.  
Public awareness is thus the key to smoothing the process of regulatory reform, 
whether or not it is complemented by privatization.  To reduce information asymmetry, the 
government needs to reveal its commitment in setting transitional paths to deal with social 
needs such as unemployment consequences of reform in a comprehensible manner, avoiding the 
overly technical language alien to most Thais.  Such education does not always indicate the 
propagandizing of pro-reform platforms.  Rather, a fair, well-balanced argument should be 
offered so that optimally everyone knows if they are a winner or loser.  If they fall in the latter 
category, the government must ensure that society will not abandon those for whom hardship is 
                                       
15 Many Thais did not understand that the ruling only had to do with privatization process, not the legality of 
privatization itself.    
16 Status quo bias refers to a situation when, facing uncertainties, players in a game oppose changes after calculating 
the expected value of reform.  For example, workers earn $100 per month but after privatization, a quarter will be 
laid off to improve efficiency.  Those unemployed will eventually find a job with an average pay of $80 but for others 
remaining with the organization, salary will be increased to $105.  With full information about winners and losers, 
three quarters of the workers will opt for reform.  Without information, however, all workers will base their 
decision on expected value of reform, which is (.25*80)+(.75*105) = 98.75, and vote against privatization.  
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created by the reform process and that their input to regulatory code drafting and 
implementation are always welcome.  This is indeed a win-win situation.  While the pubic have 
channels to voice their concerns, regulators gain credibility: an indispensable part of the 
regulatory reform process. 
 
The Future of Transport Regulation: the Road to Where? 
 
As anti-reform sentiments gained ground in Thailand, no public official dared opposing 
the union-sympathizing public and replacing the status quo with a more suitable form of transport 
regulation despite potential improvement in both economic and government performance.  
With ambitious plans for restructuring and privatization stalled, it is by no means a vacation 
period for transport regulators.  Under a top-down approach, it is crucial that they introduce 
competition to this exceedingly inefficient sector such as by setting a timetable for phasing out 
subsidies and coordinating with lawmakers in strengthening the existing competition regime, 
even if SOE ownership should remain unaltered in the short run.  Patronage ties between the 
regulator and the regulated must be broken, permitting only transparent formal interactions 
between the two, while the role of the civil society promoted.  With increasing public 
awareness and participation, the road to regulatory reform, whether complemented by 
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